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INTRODUCTION
Classic works, Mark Mizruchi and Lisa Fein argued, share a
particular fate.1 Authors often cite classic works without reading them—
or without reading them carefully. When the classics are read, they are
subjected to selective interpretation as readers emphasize the parts that fit
their preconceived notions of the world, while tending to minimize or
ignore those that do not. As these selective interpretations are
disseminated into an academic discipline, members of the field derive
their views not from the work itself, but from interpretations of the work
rendered by others. These interpretations then come to be accepted as
the “correct” readings. The classic work thus develops a socially
constructed character, in which certain components of the original—
those that fit with collectively accepted views—become the prevailing
interpretation of the work itself. This social construction is one reason,
Mizruchi and Fein suggested, that readers often experience such surprise
when they actually read (or return to) the original classic.
There are many works that exhibit this phenomenon. Mizruchi and
Fein used as their example Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell’s essay on
the tendency for organizations to come to resemble one another over
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Q. 653 (1999).

1065

1066

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:4

Another work in the sociology of organizations, Arthur
time.2
Stinchcombe’s classic article on social structure and organizations,3 has
also been selectively interpreted, as has Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald
Salancik’s study of the external control of organizations.4 Yet perhaps
no single work fits the above description better than one of the most
important books on the large corporation ever published: Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property.5 One
can speculate that few works in the social sciences have been as often
cited and as little read. As a consequence, we would expect The Modern
Corporation to be a good candidate for either selective interpretation or
outright misinterpretation. And as we shall demonstrate, the book did
indeed receive such treatment.
Although Berle and Means were concerned with the concentration
of economic power and saw the separation of ownership from control as
contributing to this trend, subsequent authors who relied on Berle and
Means’s findings used them to reach very different conclusions. In
particular, The Modern Corporation became an important touchstone for
a group of prominent mid-twentieth-century scholars, including Daniel
Bell, Ralf Dahrendorf, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Talcott Parsons.6
Drawing on Berle and Means, these authors presented a view of the large
American corporation that was considerably more benign than that
advanced in The Modern Corporation. In this paper, we will show that
the findings of The Modern Corporation were used to argue that the
2. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983).
3. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONS 142 (James G. March ed., 1965).
4. JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS:
A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE (Stanford University Press 2003) (1978). Stinchcombe
himself put this in an email message to the first author after reading the article by Mizruchi and Fein:
I have had the same thing happen to my ancient paper on Social Structure and
Organization. . . . First it was excerpted in readers to have only the section on the growth
of industry variety in history, then a couple of paragraphs of this started to be cited in the
organizational ecology literature, mainly on persistence of organizational form and the
liability of newness. In the course of this development, all the stuff on revolutions and
the stratification of organizations, on variations in the degree of coerciveness of authority
relations within organizations, etc. got lost.
E-mail from Arthur Stinchcombe, Professor Emeritus, Northwestern University, to Mark Mizruchi,
Professor, University of Michigan (Sept. 1, 2000) (on file with author). See also Pfeffer’s
introduction to the 2003 reissue of Pfeffer and Salancik’s 1978 book, p. xxiii.
5. ADOLF A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World 1968) (1932).
6. DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (Collier 1960) [hereinafter END OF IDEOLOGY]; RALF
DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (Stanford Univ. Press 1959);
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER,
(Houghton Mifflin 1952) [hereinafter AMERICAN CAPITALISM]; TALCOTT PARSONS, STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1960).

2010]

The Modern Corporation as Social Construction

1067

concentration of power in American society had declined, a view exactly
the opposite of what Berle and Means suggested. These more
celebratory readings of Berle and Means subsequently became the
objects of criticism in their own right, however.7 Still, these works
contained highly textured and nuanced understandings of the post-World
War II United States. The analyses they presented, we argue,
represented significant contributions, despite their questionable
interpretation of The Modern Corporation.
We argue that in the post-World War II period, a leading segment
of the American corporate elite adopted a moderate, pragmatic approach
that included an accommodation to government intervention in the
economy and an acceptance of the rights of organized labor. We argue
that the managerial autonomy spawned by the separation of ownership
and control provided the conditions within which American corporate
executives could engage in these policies. This system, however, began
to break down in the 1970s, and a major acquisition wave in the 1980s
brought stockholders back to prominence. Faced with pressures not seen
since the early 1900s, corporate managers became increasingly shortsighted, and the corporate elite became increasingly fragmented. The
result has been a business community unable to organize to address the
problems of the twenty-first century in a way that its predecessors did in
earlier decades. We conclude by discussing the implications of this
argument for the thesis of The Modern Corporation.
Our goals in this paper are fourfold. First, we present what we see
as Berle and Means’s primary contributions in The Modern Corporation.
Second, we describe various interpretations of this classic and situate
these interpretations in their historical contexts. Third, we discuss the
extent to which these interpretations provided an accurate account of the
state of the American corporation and American business in the postWorld War II period. We argue that these interpretations can be
reconciled when we take into account the countervailing forces of the
state, labor, and the financial community that created the conditions for a
moderate, pragmatic approach to corporate governance. Finally, we
discuss the changes that have occurred since the postwar period, from the
1970s on, and assess the fate of The Modern Corporation in light of
those changes.

7. See, e.g., Maurice Zeitlin, Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and
the Capitalist Class, 79 AM. J. OF SOC. 1073 (1974); see also Mark S. Mizruchi, Who Controls
Whom? An Examination of the Relation between Management and Boards of Directors in Large
American Corporations, 8 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 426 (1983) [hereinafter Who Controls Whom?].
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I. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE MODERN CORPORATION
In The Modern Corporation,8 Berle and Means began their
argument by emphasizing that the rise of the large corporation in the
United States left an enormous concentration of economic power in a
relatively small number of organizations. They noted that virtually all
Americans, in the course of their daily lives, are touched in one way or
another by large corporations.9 They showed that during the 1920s, the
200 largest American nonfinancial corporations experienced a growth
rate of between two and three times that of smaller nonfinancial firms.10
In addition, they raised an issue that constitutes a major theme of the
book: American society is being transformed from one ruled primarily by
market forces toward one in which a relatively small number of
individuals control the bulk of the productive capacity.11 They
continued:
The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a
giant corporation is a tremendous force [that] can harm or benefit a
multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of
trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The
organizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm
of private enterprise—they have become more nearly social
institutions.12

Berle and Means argued that as both a cause and a consequence of
the enormous size of corporations, stock ownership had become
increasingly dispersed. This is the component of the book that received
the most attention, especially in the post-World War II era. In giant
corporations such as the Pennsylvania Railroad and United States Steel,
the largest stockholders owned less than 1% of the stock.13 This stock
dispersal had increased rapidly since the early 1900s: American
Telephone and Telegraph, for example, went from 10,000 stockholders
in 1901 to more than 642,000 by 1931, and U.S. Steel’s number of
owners increased more than tenfold during the same period.14 Moreover,
in the five-year period between 1916 and 1921, the distribution of
8. In the following paragraphs, we will describe what we see as the primary argument of the
book. Because The Modern Corporation is a broad, deep, and richly textured work, no brief
summary can do it justice. It is thus unavoidable that there are some aspects of the book that we will
emphasize more than others. We encourage readers to return to the original work, which addresses a
considerably broader range of issues.
9. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 19–28.
10. Id. at 33–41.
11. Id. at 46.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 47.
14. Id. at 52.
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ownership became increasingly dispersed across a broad range of income
groups—a change of “almost revolutionary proportions,” according to
Berle and Means.15 The most important outcome of this process for the
authors, however, was that with the dispersal of stock, the owners of
large corporations had become increasingly passive with regard to
control of the firm:
In place of actual physical properties over which the owner could
exercise direction and for which he was responsible, the owner now
holds a piece of paper representing a set of rights and expectations
with respect to an enterprise. But over the enterprise and over the
physical property—the instruments of production—in which he has
an interest, the owner has little control.16

With stockholders increasingly dispersed and passive with respect
to a firm’s administration, who then assumed control? According to
Berle and Means, direction of a firm’s activities is exercised through the
board of directors. Control thus lies with those who have the power to
select the directors.17 The authors distinguished five types of control:
control through almost complete ownership, control through majority
ownership, control through a legal device, control through minority
ownership, and management control. The first two forms of control each
involve some aspect of majority ownership, in which the majority owner
has the ability to overrule any opposition, while the third, control through
a legal device, involves several forms, one of which (pyramiding)
includes effective majority ownership. Most interesting for our purposes
are the last two types, minority control and management control.
Owners can control a firm with fewer than 50% of the shares, Berle and
Means argued, but such control is not guaranteed. In the famous
Standard Oil of Indiana proxy fight, in which John D. Rockefeller, Jr.
was barely able to oust the firm’s management, Rockefeller was the
holder of 14.9% of the company’s stock.18 To Berle and Means, this
percentage represented the likely lowest point at which control via stock
ownership could be maintained.
They ultimately settled on an
admittedly arbitrary figure of 20% as the minimum level of ownership
necessary for minority control.19 In cases in which no single owner was
15. Id. at 60.
16. Id. at 64.
17. Id. at 66–67. Berle and Means defined management as the “board of directors and the
senior officers of the corporation.” Id. at 196. Most subsequent authors defined management as the
senior officers only. Mizruchi, Who Controls Whom?, supra note 7, at 427. We will use Berle and
Means’s definition, except as noted.
18. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 76.
19. Id. at 108.
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above this threshold, control of the firm was said to be effectively in the
hands of management, those who ran the day-to-day operations of the
firm. In a detailed analysis of the 200 largest American nonfinancial
corporations in 1929, the authors found that 44% of the firms could be
classified as management controlled.20 Given the historical proliferation
of stockholders that Berle and Means had identified, it stood to reason
that the American corporation was becoming increasingly characterized
by management control. Although not without controversy, a study by
Robert Larner confirmed this trend decades later. Relying on data from
1964, Larner pronounced the managerial revolution “close to
complete.”21
Berle and Means argued that the separation of ownership from
control had several important consequences. Initially, as stockholders
became increasingly dispersed and increasingly passive, they lost both
their ability and their interest in offering input into the firm’s policies.
Instead, stockholders increasingly viewed their stocks as investments,
limiting their concerns to dividend payouts and the value of their
equities. This meant that the firm’s managers became increasingly
insulated from the influence of stockholders. Meanwhile, because of the
growing concentration of industry and managers’ increasing
independence from owners, managers gained control over the
distribution of revenue, allowing them to reduce dividends and increase
retained earnings.22
In light of the separation of ownership from control, Berle and
Means advanced an alternative to the traditional justifications for the
distribution of corporate profits. Economic logic—the “logic of
profits”—suggested that those doing the work should be incentivized to
work harder, and thus, the firm’s profits should go to the managers.23
Legal logic—the “logic of property”—suggested that stockholders
should receive the firm’s profits because they are the rightful owners.24
Berle and Means argued that neither of these arguments is valid because
they both fail to recognize that property and wealth no longer mean the
same things that they did in the time of Adam Smith. For Smith, there
was no distinction between ownership and control and no difference
between passive property—shares of stocks or bonds—and active
property—the relationship of control that managers have to the
20. Id. at 86–107.
21. ROBERT J. LARNER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION (Dunellen
1970).
22. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 112–16.
23. Id. at 299–302.
24. Id. at 293–98.
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corporation.25 Because private property split into these two new forms,
the traditional logic of property no longer applies.
Similarly, Berle and Means argued that the profit motive itself has
changed in form.26 Given the immense magnitude of profits available to
large firms to distribute as incentives, as well as the diminishing returns
associated with additional amounts of income, there is no reason to
believe that managers would work twice as hard to make twice as much
money. Instead, Berle and Means suggested “that more could be learned
regarding [the motives of managers] by studying the motives of an
Alexander the Great, seeking new worlds to conquer, than by considering
the motives of a petty tradesman of the days of Adam Smith.”27 Since it
is not obvious that either managers or owners should be entitled to the
profits of modern corporations, Berle and Means suggested a third
option, one that recognized that corporations have become political units
as much as economic enterprises.
Importantly, Berle and Means described the separation of
ownership and control with some degree of consternation. The
increasing autonomy of management led to a growing concentration of
power in a relatively small group of individuals who were potentially
unaccountable to any external forces. In Berle and Means’s view, this
lack of accountability raised potential concerns for the future of
American democracy. Given corporations’ prominent positions in
society and the enormous consequences of their actions, the nation faced
a difficult set of decisions about their proper role.
In the latter part of the book, the authors returned to their earlier
concern, noted above, about the role of the corporation as a social
institution. Given its prominence and power, the corporation may have
an obligation to serve those beyond its stockholders. As we have seen,
for Berle and Means, neither managers nor owners have produced any
legitimate defense of their claim on the firm’s profits. Instead, those who
control the firm “[have] cleared the way for the claims of a group far
wider than either the owners or the control. They have placed the
community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve
not alone the owners or the control but all society.”28
This constitutes an entirely new conception of the role of the
corporation in society:
When a convincing system of community obligations is worked out
and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right
25. Id. at 304–05.
26. Id. at 307–08.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 312.
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of today must yield before the larger interests of society. . . . It is
conceivable—indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate
system is to survive—that the “control” of the great corporations
should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a
variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning
to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy
rather than private cupidity.29

The Modern Corporation, then, was a warning shot issued to
intellectuals and policy makers, notable for its Jeffersonian concerns
regarding the concentration of power as well as for its willingness to
raise questions about the larger social role of the corporation. The large
corporation had created great wealth and had the potential to be a source
for enormous good. It also posed a serious danger, however, in that its
rise had resulted in a relatively small group of extremely powerful
organizations led by individuals who were unaccountable to any external
force. Without some means by which to reign in these organizations, the
future of American democracy was in peril.
II. SITUATING INTERPRETATIONS IN THEIR HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In order to understand how various interpretations came to be, some
historical background is useful. The large corporation emerged in the
United States during the period between 1870 and 1900. The beginning
of the twentieth century witnessed the formation of the first giant firms
led by United States Steel, a conglomeration of several existing steel
companies assembled by J. P. Morgan.30 The great size of these firms
raised considerable concern among critics, but it was more than their size
per se that caught people’s attention.31 Of even greater note was the
extent to which the corporations were connected with one another in a
web of cross-cutting affiliations. Morgan and his firm, J. P. Morgan and
Company, controlled several of the leading railroads as well as U.S. Steel
and International Harvester, and Morgan and his ally, George F. Baker,
controlled several of the largest New York banks.32 Meanwhile,
Morgan’s great rival, John D. Rockefeller, not only controlled the
Standard Oil Company and several additional firms, but also was allied
with James Stillman, president of the National City Bank; Jacob Schiff of

29. Id. at 312–13.
30. MARK S. MIZRUCHI, THE AMERICAN CORPORATE NETWORK 1904–1974 18 (1982)
[hereinafter AM. CORP. NETWORK].
31. See, e.g., Sereno S. Pratt, Who Owns the United States?, 10 WORLD’S WORK 6704, 6714
(1905); IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (McClure, Phillips &
Co. 1904).
32. MIZRUCHI, supra note 30, at 134–35.
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Kuhn, Loeb & Company; and Edward H. Harriman of the Union Pacific
Railroad.33 Although Morgan and Rockefeller were sometimes viewed
as rivals,34 their interests came into alignment through an agreement,
described at the time as a “community of interest,” following the
destructive fight for control of the Great Northern Railroad.35 This
community of interest was reflected in the proliferation of director
interlocks among these firms. Baker alone sat on the boards of thirtyeight different corporations in 1904, including several leading banks.
During this period, social critics, muckraking journalists, and even
President Theodore Roosevelt railed against this “money trust.”
Congress held hearings, led by Representative Arsene Pujo of Louisiana.
Even future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis entered the fray,
publishing a series of essays under the title, Other Peoples’ Money, and
How the Bankers Use It.36 Brandeis was particularly concerned with the
prevalence of interlocking directorates, pronouncing it to be “the root of
many evils,” in that it violated “the fundamental law that no man can
serve two masters.”37 The uproar over the concentrated economic power
and the cohesive relations among the leading firms culminated with the
passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.
This period, roughly 1890 to 1920, has been termed the “era of
finance capital.”38 There is widespread agreement that the leaders of the
largest American corporations during this period constituted a basically
cohesive “capitalist class,” which formed the basis of an American social
elite, as chronicled by later writers such as Ferdinand Lundberg in
America’s Sixty Families39 and Anna Rochester in Rulers of America.40
At the same time, a series of changes had begun during the later part of
this period that, in the view of many mid-twentieth century observers, led
to the demise of this class. Among these changes was Section 8 of the
Clayton Act, which prohibited director interlocks between firms
competing in the same market. The Act sharply reduced the number of
interlocks among leading firms. In a study of 167 large U.S.
corporations, Mizruchi found that the number of interlocks among them
33. Id.
34. VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA (Harvard Univ. Press 1970).
35. THOMAS C. COCHRAN & WILLIAM MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE (Harper & Row
1961) (1942).
36. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (National
Home Library Foundation 1933) (1914). For more on Justice Brandeis, see Harwell Wells, The
Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247 (2010).
37. Id. at 35.
38. See COCHRAN & MILLER, supra note 35; CAROSSO, supra note 34.
39. FERDINAND LUNDBERG, AMERICA’S SIXTY FAMILIES (Vanguard Press 1937).
40. ANNA ROCHESTER, RULERS OF AMERICA, A STUDY OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL (Int’l
Publishers 1936).
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declined by more than 25% between 1912 and 1919.41 There was also a
generational shift, during which the founders of the leading firms of the
day—including Morgan, Baker, Rockefeller, and Stillman—died or
retired and were replaced by their sons or hand-picked successors, none
of whom approached the influence or stature of their predecessors.
A. The Modern Corporation as Great American Celebration?
The Modern Corporation appeared in the early years of the Great
Depression, and its ominous tone fit well with the grave situation in
which American society was engulfed. By the end of World War II,
however, circumstances were very different. The United States had
emerged from the war as the world’s leading economic and military
power. The war had ended the Depression, and contrary to the concerns
of many scholars and policy makers, the economy did not sink back into
a downturn once the war effort wound down. Instead, the nation
experienced an economic expansion that, with only a few relatively
minor downturns, lasted more than two decades. During this period, a
group of prominent scholars presented analyses of American society that
viewed the nation as the ideal contemporary manifestation of democracy,
a trend that C. Wright Mills derisively labeled the “curious American
celebration.”42 And ironically, contrary to the general tenor of Berle and
Means, The Modern Corporation was often used by scholars of this
period as evidence of the success of democracy in the United States.

41. MIZRUCHI, AM. CORP. NETWORK, supra note 30, at 101–02.
42. C. Wright Mills, On Knowledge and Power, 2 DISSENT 201, 204 (1955). The phrase
typically attributed to Mills (and that we use in the title to this section) is “Great American
Celebration,” usually capitalized. Despite an exhaustive search, we have been unable to find any
reference by Mills himself to the “Great,” as opposed to the “curious,” American celebration. Paul
Baran and Paul Sweezy attribute the phrase “Great American Celebration” to Mills on the first page
of their book, Monopoly Capital, without a specific citation, and the phrase was used by many
authors thereafter, always attributed to Mills and always without citation. See PAUL A. BARAN &
PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL (Monthly Review Press 1966). We suspect that Baran and
Sweezy might have used the quote from memory, with the slight alteration, and assumed that it was
not necessary to provide a direct reference. We did find a pre-Baran and Sweezy reference to the
term “great American celebration” (with “great” and “celebration” in lower case) in a review of
three books (including one by Mills) by historian C. Wilson Record. See C. Wilson Record, Of
History and Sociology, 11 AM. Q. 425, 429 (1959). It is possible that Baran and Sweezy had come
across Record’s use of the term and, given its similarity to Mills’s earlier term, mistakenly attributed
it to Mills. Or it is possible that Record himself had read Mills’s earlier article and used a similar
phrase without reference to Mills. Regardless of its origins, the subsequent attribution of the term to
Mills provides an example of a phrase taking on a life of its own, independent of its accuracy,
another example of the phenomenon discussed by Mizruchi and Fein and described in the
introduction to this paper. See Mizruchi & Fein, supra note 1. Because “Great American
Celebration” has become the term of choice, we use it, rather than “curious American celebration,”
in the title to this section.
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Perhaps the most cited reason for the presumed decline of the
capitalist class, however, was the separation of ownership from control
that Berle and Means chronicled. In fact, by the 1950s, a widely held
interpretation of Berle and Means’s findings had begun to take hold, one
that had implications that were very different from those implied by The
Modern Corporation. This interpretation, advanced by scholars such as
Daniel Bell, John Kenneth Galbraith, Talcott Parsons, and David
Riesman, reflected the view noted earlier that American society had
become increasingly democratic.43 We will begin by summarizing the
general contours of this story. We then take a closer look at some of the
major individual works that advanced this argument.
As we noted earlier, Berle and Means documented the growing
dispersal of stockholdings in large American corporations, which led to
managers’ increasing power. Freed from the dictates of stockholders,
these managers now had increasing autonomy over firm policies. Given
the lack of stockholder pressure, managers could reduce dividend
payouts, thus increasing the amount of available cash. As Berle
subsequently argued, the increased level of retained earnings allowed
managers to reduce their dependence on banks and other financial
institutions, since it was now possible to finance investment with
internally generated funds.44 Unlike the managers of the earlier
generation, the new corporate managers were bureaucrats whose primary
allegiance was to their own firm rather than to a group of firms under one
center of control. This focus on the internal workings of their own firms
was believed to have led to a decline in cross-firm cohesiveness. The
American business community thus became, in Dahrendorf’s words, a
plurality of “partly agreed, partly competing, and partly simply different
groups.”45
This presumed “decomposition of capital,” as Dahrendorf called it,
had important implications for the viability of American democracy.46
The economist Joseph Schumpeter, in his 1942 classic, Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy, argued that political life in industrialized
democratic societies was dominated by a relatively small group of elites,
while most citizens were largely apathetic about politics.47 Because the
vibrancy of democracy depends on an engaged public, Schumpeter asked
43. See BELL, END OF IDEOLOGY, supra note 6; GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, supra
note 6; PARSONS, supra note 6; DAVID RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING
AMERICAN CHARACTER (Anchor 1953).
44. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 35–41 (Harcourt,
Brace & World 1954) [hereinafter CAPITALIST REVOLUTION].
45. DAHRENDORF, supra note 6, at 47.
46. Id. at 41.
47. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
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how it was possible to claim that these societies were democratic in any
sense of the word. The answer, he concluded, was that the elites who
dominated these societies were themselves politically divided. Although
one or more segments within this group might be connected to those in
office, one or more opposing segments—without such connections—
stood as challengers whose candidates had the potential to prevail in
subsequent elections. If the public were to become sufficiently
dissatisfied with the party in office, it had the option of replacing the
current occupants of power with their opponents. This occurred in the
United States in 1932 and, after Schumpeter’s time, in several
subsequent U.S. presidential elections, including the 1968, 1980, and
1992 elections.48 The existence of democracy in these societies,
Schumpeter thus argued, depended on the presence of significant
divisions within the elite. Similar arguments were later made by John
Kenneth Galbraith and Seymour Martin Lipset.49
But on what basis did these elite divisions occur? In a 1958 essay,
political scientist Robert Dahl argued that for a group to be powerful,
two elements must be present: the group must have an abundance of
resources on one hand and a high degree of unity on the other.50 Many
observers, including Dahl and Galbraith, had acknowledged that large
corporations had a high level of resources. This meant that to the extent
that these corporations could maintain any semblance of unity, their
presence could contain serious consequences for the functioning of
American democracy. Galbraith argued, however, that the wide range of
often-conflicting interests among industries—and among firms within
industries—created what he called “countervailing power,” in which
these cross-cutting interests canceled out one another, thereby preventing
large corporations from constituting themselves as a unified political
force.
With its emphasis on stock dispersal and on the rise of bureaucratic
managers, The Modern Corporation was assumed by several authors to
provide evidence for the rise of this countervailing power and, therefore,
for the increasingly democratic character of American society. A good
example of this was presented by the great sociological theorist Talcott
Parsons in a critique of C. Wright Mills’s The Power Elite.51 Mills had
argued that a relatively small, cohesive group consisting of leaders of
large corporations, the government, and the military dominated the
48. Id. at 269–83.
49. See GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, supra note 6; Seymour Martin Lipset,
Introduction to R OBERT M ICHELS, P OLITICAL P ARTIES 15 (Free Press 1962).
50. Robert A. Dahl, A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 463 (1958).
51. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956) [hereinafter POWER ELITE].
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political life of American society. In taking issue with this argument, in
particular with Mills’s depiction of large corporations, Parsons suggested
that
[Mills] continues to speak of power within the economy as based on
property. To a considerable degree, of course, this is legally true,
since the legal control of enterprise rests with stockholders. But, as
Berle and Means made abundantly clear, very generally it is not
substantively true.
In the old-style family enterprise, still
predominant in the small-business sector of the economy, the
functions of management and ownership are fused in the same
people. In the larger enterprise they have by and large become
differentiated . . . . In general, property holdings have not, of
course, been expropriated, except for their diminution through
inheritance and income taxes . . . . What has happened is that their
relation to the power structure of the economy has been greatly
altered. Mills almost entirely passes over this change.52

Parsons’s characterization of Berle and Means’s argument is not
factually inaccurate. Berle and Means, and certainly Berle in his later
writings,53 did indeed argue that the relation between property ownership
and corporate control had changed. What differs is Parsons’s use of this
point. Parsons criticized Mills for suggesting that power in the corporate
world was highly concentrated. He implied, on the contrary, that power
had become dispersed, and he cited Berle and Means as support. Yet as
we have seen, Berle and Means did not argue that power had become
dispersed. Instead, they, like Mills, were concerned that corporate power
had become highly concentrated, and unlike Parsons, they believed that
the separation of ownership from control had helped further this
concentration.54
Of course, Parsons was writing in the late 1950s, nearly three
decades after The Modern Corporation was published. And Berle
himself, in a review in the New York Times,55 offered a critique of Mills’s
book. Berle’s criticisms of Mills, however, were based on a very
different set of arguments. He did not take issue with Mills’s point that
there was a high concentration of power in American society. Rather,
Berle questioned whether those in power were as amoral as Mills had
52. PARSONS, supra note 6, at 210 (emphasis in original). We should note that Parsons’s claim
that legal control of the firm rests with the stockholders does not follow from Berle and Means’s
argument. Berle and Means actually devoted considerable attention in The Modern Corporation (in
fact much of the second half of the book) to the extent to which the legal power of stockholders had
been weakened. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5.
53. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959) [hereinafter POWER].
54. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5.
55. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Are the Blind Leading the Blind?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1956.
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indicated. In fairness to Parsons, he did not explicitly attribute to Berle
and Means the claim that the separation of ownership from control had
led to a dispersal of power. The quote above suggests that Parsons did
imply such a connection, however.
Parsons was not the only social scientist who made the link
between the separation of ownership and control and the dispersal of
power. Ralf Dahrendorf, as we noted above, drew a similar connection.56
Consistent with Berle and Means, Dahrendorf argued that the dispersal
of stock had transformed the relation between property ownership and
the firm’s administration in contemporary developed societies. But
Dahrendorf went further than Berle and Means in describing the
consequences of this stock dispersal. For Dahrendorf, the fusion of
ownership and control was a central component of capitalism. Because
this unity had ruptured and because those who controlled the firm were
now mere bureaucrats as opposed to entrepreneurs, Dahrendorf argued
that the separation of ownership from control had ushered forth the end
of capitalism and made way for a new, “post-capitalist” society.57 The
capitalist class posited by Marx in the nineteenth century had given way
to a class of career bureaucrats, whose primary loyalty lay with their
employer rather than with a class of property owners. This provided the
basis for Dahrendorf’s claim, cited above, that “[c]apital—and thereby
capitalism—[had] dissolved and given way, in the economic sphere, to a
plurality of partly agreed, partly competing, and partly simply different
groups.”58 Because this plurality of cross-cutting groups rendered unity
among corporations extremely difficult, if not impossible, Dahrendorf’s
discussion suggests that business would be unable to constitute itself as a
singularly powerful political actor. As with Parsons, then, Dahrendorf
used Berle and Means’s findings to argue that corporate power had
become increasingly dispersed in American society, exactly the opposite
conclusion from that drawn, or at least suggested, in The Modern
Corporation.
Ironically, even a Marxist critic of The Modern Corporation,
Maurice Zeitlin, appears to have missed Berle and Means’s concerns
about the potential concentration of power wrought by the rise of the
large corporation.59 Zeitlin is for the most part faithful to the text of The
Modern Corporation. In fact, his account is far more detailed than most
56. Parsons and Dahrendorf were leading representatives of two major—and directly
opposing—approaches to sociological theory during the 1950s. It is, therefore, ironic to see the two
of them on the same side of this issue.
57. DAHRENDORF, supra note 6, at 41–47.
58. Id. at 47.
59. Zeitlin, supra note 7.
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of the more celebratory citations of the book. Nevertheless, in focusing
exclusively on Berle and Means’s analysis of ownership and control,
Zeitlin neglects to mention the authors’ concerns regarding the
concentration of economic power. This omission, combined with his
numerous quotations from authors who used The Modern Corporation as
evidence for the dispersal of power in American society, gives the
impression that Berle and Means themselves shared this conclusion. One
possible reason that Zeitlin ignores Berle and Means’s concerns about
the concentration of power may be that he is more focused on the
interpreters of Berle and Means than on the original work itself, and his
emphasis is on their arguments about the dispersal of power.60 A second
possible reason is that Zeitlin is concerned with making the case for a
particular view, in which power is held by a property-owning class that
exercises its control through its ownership of corporations. This is
reflected in the fact that even other Marxist analysts, such as Baran and
Sweezy,61 come under criticism from Zeitlin for accepting Berle and
Means’s conclusion on the separation of ownership from control.
Whatever the reason, the fact that Zeitlin does not address Berle and
Means’s statements on the concentration of corporate power leaves the
impression, even if unintended, that they were not concerned about this
issue. Yet regardless of the views of scholars such as Bell, Dahrendorf,
and Parsons, it seems clear that Berle and Means themselves were not
participants in an uncritical “celebration” of American society. On the
contrary, they offered a considerably more cautious appraisal, based on a
genuine concern with the potentially unchecked power of the large
American corporation.
B. The Modern Corporation as Social Criticism
Although some scholars used The Modern Corporation as evidence
for the dispersal of power and the spread of democracy in American
society, others were more cognizant of the critical aspects of the work
and provided a more nuanced interpretation. A good example of this is
in American Capitalism by John Kenneth Galbraith.62 Aware that the
massive government spending on World War II had lifted the United
States out of the Great Depression, many scholars and policy makers
were concerned that once the war ended, the nation would again
experience a major economic collapse. This collapse did not occur,
however, and Galbraith’s book was an attempt to understand why.

60. Id. at 1074–80.
61. BARAN & SWEEZY, supra note 42.
62. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, supra note 6.
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Galbraith began by suggesting that the American economy had left
behind the system of competitive capitalism and had instead become a
system dominated by a relatively small number of large corporations.
Unlike authors such as Dahrendorf and Parsons, Galbraith drew
upon The Modern Corporation as evidence of economic concentration.63
In fact, Galbraith did not even make an explicit reference to the
separation of ownership from control, although he did imply its existence
when discussing the role of managers in administering firms.
Interestingly, however, Galbraith did ultimately conclude that corporate
power is limited.64 Labor unions, the government, and even consumers
have the ability to exercise constraints on the actions of firms, Galbraith
argued. This suggests that countervailing power had its sources in
sectors outside as well as inside the business community, a point that
Berle himself made by drawing on Galbraith in one of his later works.65
Interestingly, then, the situation that Berle and Means envisioned, in
which corporations answer to elements of the larger society—what in
contemporary terms are referred to as “stakeholders”—had, according to
Galbraith, become a reality by the early 1950s. In that sense, Galbraith
may have also contributed to the optimism about the nature of American
society in the postwar era, even as he acknowledged the critical nature of
The Modern Corporation.
Yet, by the late 1960s, Galbraith had become more cautious in his
praise and more radical in his conclusions. In The New Industrial State,
he argued not only that control was no longer in the hands of owners, but
also that it no longer resided with managers.66 Instead, he suggested that
effective control was now in the hands of a “technostructure”—those
“who bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group
decision-making.”67 “This [technostructure], not the management,”
Galbraith argued, “is the guiding intelligence—the brain—of the
enterprise.”68 Building on a theme that Berle69 and others had discussed,
Galbraith argued that because the ownership of capital had become
increasingly irrelevant in industrialized societies, in many respects, the
economies of the United States and the Soviet Union had increasingly
come to resemble one another. Both economies were characterized by
significant central planning. Indeed, Galbraith and Berle both made
63. Id. at 39–41; BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5.
64. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, supra note 6, at 108–34.
65. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 53.
66. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (Houghton Mifflin 1967)
[hereinafter NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE].
67. Id. at 71.
68. Id.
69. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 53.
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reference to the central role of the government in American economic
policy. And in both societies, producers were relatively insulated from
the market.
Galbraith and Berle also argued, along with Dahrendorf and others,
that the entrepreneur played little role in the American economy during
the 1950s and 1960s.70 Perhaps Galbraith’s most interesting reference to
Berle and Means, however, was his observation on the relation between
corporations and the state. Galbraith suggested that for Berle and Means,
as corporate power became increasingly unchecked, it would be
necessary for the state to appropriate power from the managers.71
Galbraith even went so far as to label Berle a socialist:
This formidable conclusion [regarding the possible need for the
state to appropriate power], which was expressed in guarded terms,
came toward the end of a long book. It seems to have been
overlooked. Had his numerous critics been more diligent, Professor
Berle’s early commitment to socialism would, one imagines, have
been more celebrated during his long and greatly distinguished
public career.72

We believe that Galbraith likely exaggerated, or at least
misrepresented, Berle and Means’s argument here. In our reading, Berle
and Means maintained that it might be advantageous for corporations to
be run in the interests of a range of stakeholders, including labor,
consumers, and the larger community, but they did not suggest that
corporations be controlled by the state. Nevertheless, Galbraith’s
interpretation represents an example of the extent to which Berle and
Means’s own critical perspective was evident to those who gave the book
a close reading.
Another innovative application of the ideas in The Modern
Corporation was provided by Daniel Bell. Our praise of Bell in this
context may be ironic to some readers, considering that Zeitlin criticized
Bell for uncritically accepting the idea of the dissolution of the capitalist
class in the early twentieth century.73 In The End of Ideology, Bell did
indeed argue that family capitalism in the United States had generally
disappeared, at least among the largest corporations.74 He also accepted
Galbraith’s concept of countervailing power and issued a biting critique
of Mills’s The Power Elite, arguing, similar to Dahrendorf and Parsons,
70. GALBRAITH, NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, supra note 66; BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY,
supra note 53; DAHRENDORF, supra note 6.
71. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, supra note 66, at 119.
72. Id. at 127.
73. Zeitlin, supra note 7, at 1076–77.
74. DANIEL BELL, END OF IDEOLOGY, supra note 6.
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that the decline of family capitalism contributed to the dissolution of
corporate power.75 In a subsequent work, however, Bell charted a new
direction that acknowledged the concerns that Berle and Means had
originally raised.76
Bell’s primary focus in this work, The Coming of Post-Industrial
Society, was on the social ramifications of the shift in the American
economy from one based on manufacturing to one based primarily on
service.77 Included in his discussion was a critique of the idea,
expounded most notably by Milton Friedman, that, as Bell put it,
“individual satisfaction is the unit in which costs and benefits are to be
reckoned.”78 Bell argues that this view “reflects the utilitarian fallacy
that the sum total of individual decisions is equivalent to a social
decision.”79 Bell proposes what he terms the “sociologizing” mode as an
alternative: “the effort to judge society’s needs in a more conscious
fashion.”80 He argues that as we move into post-industrial society, the
value of a corporation will increasingly be based on the extent to which it
responds to the needs of its full set of stakeholders.
Although Bell does not refer to The Modern Corporation in this
work, he does mention the oft-cited debate between Berle81 and Merrick
Dodd82 regarding to whom the corporation is responsible.83 Ironically, as
will be well-known to readers of this journal, it was Dodd who argued
for the stakeholder view of the firm in this debate. Berle’s concern was
that in the absence of a “clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of
responsibilities,” management would be able to act in its own interests
and then arbitrarily identify one or more stakeholders as the presumed
beneficiaries of management’s actions. Of course, Berle subsequently
came to accept Dodd’s view, and both positions served as an important
reference point for Bell. So despite his seeming acceptance of Berle and
Means’s “dispersal of power” interpretation, Bell ultimately came to

75. DAHRENDORF, supra note 6; PARSONS, supra note 6.
76. DANIEL BELL, THE COMING POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (Basic 1973) [hereinafter POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY].
77. Id.
78. Id. at 282–83 (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 283.
80. Id.
81. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as a Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
82. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932).
83. For discussions of the ways in which this debate continues to influence contemporary legal
scholarship, see, for example, William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. C ORP. L. 100 (2008); David
Millon, Berle vs. Dodd After 80 Years: Why Are We Still Arguing About This?, presented at In
Berle’s Footsteps, a symposium at Seattle University School of Law, November 6–8, 2009.
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embrace the need to reign in the corporation—a position much closer to
the concerns raised in the later chapters of The Modern Corporation.
III. BUT PERHAPS THEY WERE RIGHT
We have seen that there were two broad interpretations of The
Modern Corporation that led to two very different conceptions of the
role of the large corporation. On one hand, in a view seemingly closer to
Berle and Means’s original concerns, there were authors who focused on
the dangers of concentrated economic power wrought by the
concentration of industry and the lack of accountability of management.
On the other hand, there were those who saw the separation of ownership
from control as the source of the dispersal of corporate power and the
consequent further democratization of American society. One question
we need to ask is whether these two interpretations are compatible. A
second question is whether either, or both, turned out to be historically
accurate.
We believe that the two views indeed are compatible but not
because we believe that corporate power actually became dispersed by
the mid-twentieth century. Instead, we argue that while power among
large corporations remained highly concentrated, a series of institutional
factors compelled corporate leaders to act in ways that were, if not
completely socially responsible, at least relatively benign compared to
the standards of the twenty-first century. We believe that the concept of
countervailing power, as applied to the relations between corporations
and non-business actors, provides a generally tenable description of the
situation that prevailed in the postwar period. To make this case, we
begin by providing a brief historical account of the political ideology of
American business executives.
We then describe the three
countervailing forces that we believe placed constraints on the actions of
large corporations during this period: the state, organized labor, and the
financial community. Finally, we describe the forces that contributed to
the breakdown of this arrangement and the consequences this breakdown
had for the current status of American corporate managers.
A. Corporate Ideology and the Countervailing Powers that Compelled
Moderate Corporate Behavior
1. The Ideology and Behavior of American Corporate Leaders
There is widespread agreement that the vast majority of American
business executives have historically held political views that would,

1084

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:4

under today’s labels, be termed “conservative.”84 These views include
support for free markets, suspicion of government intervention in the
economy, support for low individual and corporate taxes, and opposition
to organized labor. They have been reflected in businesspeople’s
consistently strong support for the Republican Party. They were
reflected in businesspeople’s widespread opposition to the New Deal
reforms of the 1930s. And, they were reflected in support for the turn
toward free market policies that began in the late 1970s and continued
into the twenty-first century.
Despite the support for these conservative ideas among most
American businesspeople, there has been a subset of American
executives that held more moderate views since at least the early 1900s.
The National Civic Federation, formed in 1900, consisted of prominent
business leaders, labor leaders, academics, and politicians, all of whom
were dedicated to finding solutions for the most deleterious
consequences of free-market capitalism.85 The corporate executives in
this group never constituted more than a small percentage of the
corporate leaders of the day, however, and the organization had become
greatly weakened by the 1920s. This group nevertheless provided
evidence that there were some corporate officials who saw a need for
both private firms and the state to take a more active role in providing
basic social services for workers. Many of the ideas proposed by this
group were eventually adopted as welfare policies by private firms and
also became the basis of New Deal reforms during the 1930s. 86
A similar group of relatively moderate corporate leaders emerged in
the period after World War II. Centered in organizations such as the
Committee for Economic Development and the Council on Foreign
Relations, these business executives were associated primarily with the
largest corporations and financial institutions, and they tended to sit on
the boards of two or more firms.87 In contrast with most American
businesspeople, these leaders held a relatively broad, cosmopolitan
orientation, in which they sought to reach an accommodation with
members of alternative sectors of the society. This included limited
acceptance of the right of labor unions to engage in collective bargaining,
84. See HERMAN E. KROOSS, EXECUTIVE OPINION: WHAT BUSINESS LEADERS SAID AND
THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC ISSUES 1920S–1960S (1970); David Vogel, Why Businessmen Distrust
Their State: The Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives, 8 BRIT. J. OF POL. SCI.
45 (1978) [hereinafter Why Businessmen Distrust].
85. JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900–1918 (1968).
86. NEIL J. MITCHELL, THE GENEROUS CORPORATION: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC
POWER (1989).
87. MICHAEL USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE: LARGE CORPORATIONS AND THE RISE OF BUSINESS
POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. AND U.K. (1984).
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a similarly limited acknowledgement of the occasional value of
government regulation of the economy, and cautious support for civil
rights and anti-poverty legislation.88
Considerable debate exists regarding the extent to which these
views reflected a set of ideological beliefs or a pragmatic response to
reality.89 There is some evidence that the beliefs were in fact genuine.
In a survey of 120 leading corporate executives conducted in 1971, Allen
Barton found widespread support for Keynesian deficit spending, for
federal antipoverty programs, and for the idea that the government
should provide jobs when the private economy is unable to do so.90
Regardless of whether these views reflected deeply held convictions,
they at least indicated that many of the leading corporate executives were
willing to adopt a pragmatic approach toward policy.
This relatively moderate strategy of the leading corporations was
held in place, we argue, by three countervailing forces: (1) a relatively
powerful and active state; (2) a relatively powerful and well-organized
labor movement; and (3) a financial community capable of mediating
conflicts of interest among firms and disciplining recalcitrant individual
capitalists. We turn now to a discussion of these forces.
2. The State
Prior to the Great Depression, the government played a relatively
minor role in the American economy.91 The Federal Reserve System,
which was not established until 1913, handled monetary policy, and
various regulations had been passed in the late 1800s, including the
Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. It was not until
the 1930s, however, that the government began to play a significant
direct role in the economy. By the postwar period, programs such as
Social Security and financial regulations imposed by the Glass–Steagall
Act, which forced commercial and investment banks to separate, and the
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR
RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–1994 (1995).
90. Allen H. Barton, Determinants of Economic Attitudes in the American Business Elite, 91
AM. J. SOC. 54 (1985).
91. This statement requires clarification. Broadly construed, the economy includes the
organization of production and distribution of goods and services in the entire nation. From this
standpoint, the Civil War could be seen as a government intervention into the economy, ending a
particular form of production (slavery). Similarly, the government’s role in the establishment and
maintenance of property rights dates back to the nation’s birth. When we say that the government
played a relatively minor role in the economy prior to the 1930s, we are highlighting the absence of
the sorts of interventions now most commonly debated, such as regulations involving working
conditions; pay; environmental standards; tax policies designed to stimulate investment in particular
sectors; and social welfare programs for the sick, disabled, and elderly.
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Securities Exchange Act, which created the Securities and Exchange
Commission, had become taken-for-granted aspects of the institutional
landscape.92 The state’s most important role beginning in the 1930s,
however, was the introduction of Keynesian fiscal policy, in which the
government used tax and spending measures, including deficit spending,
in an attempt to ensure economic stability.
Keynesian theory was based in part on the idea that developed
capitalist societies had a built-in tendency for aggregate demand to lag
behind production. Without some way to increase demand, the economy
would sink into a recession or, if the gap was sufficiently severe, a
depression. Through policies such as Social Security, welfare, and the
largest element of the budget—military expenditures—the state helped
increase demand, thus heading off the threat of a depression.93 Although
some government social policies ran counter to the free market ideology
of most businesspeople, the enormous economic success that the United
States experienced in the postwar period tended to minimize opposition
to these policies. In fact, dating from the 1930s, there were significant
numbers of leading business figures who accepted the idea that the
government would play a significant role in the economy.94 This
approach reached its culmination with the formation of the Committee
for Economic Development (CED) in 1942. As Robert Collins notes,
this group reflected policies similar to those of the earlier National Civic
Federation, with an emphasis on cooperation among business,
government, and labor.95 The CED attempted to address economic and
social problems through technical expertise rather than political
ideology, and its members supported a significant and growing role for
the federal government, including the idea of government support to
maintain high levels of employment—a view echoed in the responses to
Barton’s survey three decades later.96 The influence of the CED and
other groups of leading businesspeople, a more broadly liberal-political
atmosphere, and the economic success experienced by the United States
in the postwar period fed the continued adherence to Keynesian
economic policies through both Democratic and Republican
administrations. By the turn of the 1970s, these policies had become so

92. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act (Cullom Act), ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Sherman
Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890); Banking Act (Glass–Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162
(1933); Securities Exchange Act (‘34 Act), ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
93. ROBERT M. COLLINS, THE BUSINESS RESPONSE TO KEYNES, 1929–1964 (1981).
94. Id. at 56–64.
95. See id.
96. Barton, supra note 90.
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widely accepted that President Nixon remarked, in 1971, that “I am now
a Keynesian in economics.”97
In addition to its role in stabilizing the economy, beginning in the
1930s, the state also became increasingly involved in regulating business
practices. First and foremost among these regulations was the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, which established the minimum wage, rules for
overtime pay, and restrictions on the use of child labor.98 The
government also involved itself in the regulation of several industries,
including oil, sugar, and transportation. In such cases, the industries
themselves either sought or supported regulation as a means of ensuring
a level playing field and of preventing disruptive behavior—a point that
Berle noted in one of his later works.99 Through both its economic and
regulatory policies, then, the state imposed constraints that contributed to
the moderate political strategy adopted by the American corporate elite.
3. Labor
Although management and workers share similar interests in certain
respects—both have an interest in the survival and prosperity of the firm,
for example—it has long been acknowledged that they have opposing
interests in other respects. There are few American corporations that,
other things being equal, would prefer that their workers be organized,
and management has both resisted the formation of unions and attempted
to weaken them once formed. Nevertheless, there have been periods in
which some corporate officials have been willing to accommodate
unions, especially in cases in which alternative courses of action were
seen as even more objectionable. In the early 1900s, for example, when
the prospect of socialism was a genuine concern to American business
leaders, some firms were willing to accept unions that were more
moderate. The American Federation of Labor gained its initial foothold
precisely in response to these conditions.100
The 1930s witnessed a broad increase in unionization in the
American business world, and the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935

97. The quote, “We are all Keynesians now,” is often attributed to Nixon, but it was actually
originally stated, interestingly, by the militantly free-market economist Milton Friedman in a 1965
interview in Time magazine. In a subsequent letter to the editor, Friedman maintained that he had
been quoted out of context. Letter from Milton Friedman to Editor, TIME 13 (Feb. 4, 1966). His full
comment, he recalled in the letter, was, “In one sense, we are all Keynesians now; in another,
nobody is any longer a Keynesian.” Id.
98. Fair Labor Standards Act (Black–Connery Fair Labor Standards Act), ch. 676, 52 Stat.
1060 (1938) (current version as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2010)).
99. BERLE, CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 50.
100. DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 82–119 (2d ed. 1993).
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increased unions’ ability to organize.101 Given labor shortages during the
war, unions became increasingly militant, and strike activity increased
sharply. By 1950, there were 424 work stoppages in the Unites States,
involving nearly 1.7 million workers.102 The number rose to a high of
more than 2.7 million workers in 1952.103 Increasingly concerned with
the lost work time resulting from this worker militancy, some large firms
reached agreements with their unions to limit the number of disruptions.
These agreements, typified by the 1950 “Treaty of Detroit” involving
General Motors and the United Auto Workers, became known as the
“capital–labor accord.”104 As Bowles et al. put it:
Corporations would retain absolute control over the essential
decisions governing enterprise operations—decisions involving
production, technology, plant location, investment, and
marketing . . . . In return, unions were accepted as legitimate
representatives of workers’ interests. They were expected to
bargain on behalf of labor’s immediate economic interests, but not
to challenge employer control of enterprises . . . . Unions would
help maintain an orderly and disciplined labor force while
corporations would reward workers with a share of the income
gains made possible by rising productivity, with greater
employment security, and with improved working conditions.105

In other words, corporations were willing to accept the existence of
unions, along with higher wages and benefits, in return for labor peace
and control of the work process.
There has been renewed debate among labor historians regarding
whether the capital–labor accord ever existed. Several scholars argue
that business not only continued to aggressively fight labor during this
period, but that American corporations never accepted the legitimacy of
unions.106 Rather, as McIntyre and Hillard suggest, business and labor at
most reached a partial truce rather than a genuine accord.107
101. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner–Connery Labor Relations Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat.
449 (1935).
102. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WORK STOPPAGES
INVOLVING 1,000 OR MORE WORKERS, 1947–2009 (2010), available at www.bls.gov/news.release
/wkstp.t01.htm.
103. Id.
104. SAMUEL BOWLES, DAVID M. GORDON & THOMAS E. WEISSKOPF, BEYOND THE
WASTELAND: A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE TO ECONOMIC DECLINE (Anchor Doubleday 1983).
105. Id. at 73.
106. See, e.g., ELIZABETH A. FONES–WOLF, SELLING FREE ENTERPRISE: THE BUSINESS
ASSAULT ON LABOR AND LIBERALISM, 1945–60 (1994); GROSS, supra note 89; NELSON
LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR (2002).
107. Richard McIntyre & Michael Hillard, The ‘Limited Capital–Labor Accord’: May it Rest in
Peace?, 40 REV. OF RADICAL POL. ECON. 244 (2008).
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We agree that there are reasons to doubt the extent to which
employers internalized ideas about the acceptance of labor unions. We
also believe, however, that whether this accord reflected deeply held
attitudes toward unions is beside the point. Just as the corporate support
for certain Keynesian economic policies reflected a pragmatic adaptation
to a seemingly immutable reality, the acceptance of collective bargaining
also reflected an understanding that unions were a basic component of
business life, even if they were undesirable. Certainly unions could be
fought, just as government redistributive economic policies could arouse
opposition. Given unions’ existence, however, many corporate leaders
reasoned that it was preferable to make their peace with them.
4. The Financial Community
In addition to government and labor, the financial community also
contributed to the relatively moderate stance of the postwar corporate
elite by serving as a meeting place for its leading members.
Commentators from future Justice Brandeis to Daniel Bell noted the
central role played by major banks and insurance companies in the early
twentieth century.108 As these authors noted, the banks, led by J. P.
Morgan, George F. Baker, and others, were the most powerful
corporations of the era.
Most observers believed that banks’ power waned after the
Depression, however. First, the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 forced
commercial and investment banks to separate their functions,
significantly weakening both groups.109 Second, as several authors
argued, nonfinancial corporations, especially after the war, became
increasingly able to finance their investments with retained earnings.
Thus, nonfinancial corporations reduced their dependence on banks, and
the banks’ power was further reduced. This latter point ultimately came
under dispute. In a study of corporations’ use of external financing
between 1925 and 1955, John Lintner found that the level of external
financing had remained virtually constant during the period,110 and a
subsequent study by Linda Stearns revealed that the level of external
financing actually increased beginning in the mid-1960s and remained
high into the early 1980s.111 Still, by the postwar period, it was difficult
108. BRANDEIS, supra note 36; BELL, END OF IDEOLOGY, supra note 6.
109. Banking Act (Glass–Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (repealed 1999).
110. John Lintner, The Financing of Corporations, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY
166 (Edward Mason ed., 1959).
111. Linda Brewster Stearns, Capital Market Effects on External Control of Corporations, 15
THEORY & SOC. 47, 53 (1986). Of course, the mere use of external funding does not necessarily
mean that corporations are dependent upon it. Firms may borrow when interest rates are low or for
tax benefits, even when suitable alternatives exist. In a study of twenty-two large firms between
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to argue that banks exercised control over nonfinancial corporations in
the way that J. P. Morgan and others had done at the turn of the century.
The banks nevertheless continued to play an important role. Even
if nonfinancial corporations were not ultimately dependent on them for
capital, the banks were uniquely positioned to provide information and
advice because they were “industry-neutral.” That is, they had no reason
to favor any particular industry over another, except on the basis of
which investment would produce the highest overall return for the
system as a whole.112 Perhaps as a result of this factor, the major
commercial banks, the leading insurance companies, and significant
lenders of capital were consistently the most central nodes in the
networks created by director interlocks among firms from the early
twentieth century through the 1970s.113
Although it is difficult to conclusively demonstrate, there is
evidence to suggest that the banks, while rarely exercising control over
firms, played a moderating influence during the postwar period.114 This
was evident in the widely discussed case in which Saul P. Steinberg, an
entrepreneur and the head of Leasco, attempted to acquire Chemical
Bank, one of the six leading New York money-market banks, in 1968.
Within two weeks of Steinberg announcing his bid, Leasco’s stock had
dropped by nearly 30%, and it continued to drop in the following weeks,
thus ending Steinberg’s bid. A primary reason for the decline of
Leasco’s stock price was that the trust departments of the six major New
York banks—Chemical and its five competitors—all held stock in
Leasco and all simultaneously sold their Leasco stock after Steinberg’s
announcement of his bid.115 This event provides an illustration of the
way in which banks were occasionally willing to intercede to discipline
what they viewed as recalcitrant individual capitalists.
B. The Modern Corporation and the Postwar Accommodation
The above description of the postwar corporate elite suggests two
things: on one hand, the power of large corporations may in fact have
become highly concentrated, just as Berle and Means had feared; on the
1956 and 1983, Mizruchi and Stearns showed that even when interest rates and a series of other
financial variables were controlled, a low level of retained earnings was the strongest predictor of
firms’ use of debt. Mark S. Mizruchi & Linda Brewster Stearns, A Longitudinal Study of Borrowing
by Large American Corporations, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 118 (1994). This suggests that when internal
funds are available, firms tend to use them.
112. BETH MINTZ & MICHAEL SCHWARTZ, THE POWER STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN BUSINESS
(1985).
113. MIZRUCHI, AM. CORP. NETWORK, supra note 30.
114. MINTZ & SCHWARTZ, supra note 112.
115. DAVITA SILFEN GLASBERG, THE POWER OF COLLECTIVE PURSE STRINGS 102–18 (1989).
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other hand, the constraints faced by large corporations created a situation
in which corporate leaders behaved in a relatively moderate, even
socially responsible, fashion. To the extent that the latter was the case, it
suggests that the postwar interpreters—scholars such as Bell,
Dahrendorf, and Galbraith—had identified a genuine feature of the
American corporate landscape. And we shall argue that this was indeed
the case. However much any of these authors may have selectively
interpreted, or even distorted, the writings of Berle and Means, the
picture that they painted of the post-World War II United States was
largely accurate. We acknowledge that this is a potentially controversial
argument. It is one that we believe is supported by the evidence,
however.
Our case begins with Zeitlin’s critique of the argument for the
separation of ownership from control.116 Although Zeitlin takes issue
with Berle and Means, his primary targets are the mid-twentieth century
sociologists, such as Bell, Dahrendorf, and Parsons, who used Berle and
Means’s findings to argue that the capitalist class had dissolved.117 As
we saw, these observers were willing to acknowledge that American
society had a generally cohesive group of leading businesspeople at the
turn of the twentieth century, but they argued that this group had
disappeared over time as power and property were decoupled. The
Modern Corporation, with its data on stock dispersal, was used as the
empirical foundation for these arguments. In criticizing Berle and
Means’s findings, Zeitlin called into question the extent to which
ownership and control had in fact become separated. To do this, Zeitlin
returned to the detailed table in The Modern Corporation118 in which
Berle and Means provided a list of the 200 corporations in their analysis,
the size of their largest stockholders, the source of their information, and
their classification of the firm. It was this table from which Berle and
Means concluded that 88.5 of the 200 largest American nonfinancial
corporations could be classified as management-controlled.119 Zeitlin
showed, however, that for nearly half of the firms in Berle and Means’s
table, the authors were admittedly unable to locate a significant owning
interest, and thus, they classified the firm as “presumably” under
management control. Zeitlin concluded that Berle and Means had
demonstrated a clear basis for management control in only 22% of their

116. Zeitlin, supra note 7.
117. Id. at 1073–80.
118. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 86–107.
119. Berle and Means classified some firms as under joint control, hence, the one-half figure.
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firms, as opposed to the 44% figure that the authors themselves
ultimately provided.120
Regardless of the questions that might have been raised about Berle
and Means’s findings, one would think that the argument had been put to
rest three decades later in a study by Robert Larner.121 Using a more
stringent criterion for management control, Larner found that 84% of the
200 largest U.S. nonfinancial corporations could be classified as
management-controlled. 122 This finding, which was cited by Berle and
Means themselves in the 1968 reissue of their book, suggested to Larner
that the managerial revolution was “close to complete.”123
Any set of results that relies on an arbitrary metric for identifying
management control can, of course, be challenged—a point that Berle
and Means were clear to note. Zeitlin, citing studies by Robert
Sheehan,124 Philip Burch,125 and others, argued that Larner’s findings
themselves could be called into question.126 Sheehan, an editor of
Fortune, for example, was able to identify fifty-two firms among the 500
largest American nonfinancials that Larner had classified as
management-controlled that in fact were more likely controlled by
owners. Although this may appear to be an impressive refutation of
Larner’s findings, one could argue that it had little impact on his general
conclusion. Larner had found that ninety-five, or 19%, of the 500 largest
U.S. nonfinancial firms were owner-controlled. When Sheehan’s
additional fifty-two firms are added to the tally, the proportion of ownercontrolled firms increases to 29.4%. This hardly stands as strong
evidence for widespread owner control.127
Similarly, Burch argued that 45% of the 300 largest manufacturing
and mining corporations could be classified as “probably” familycontrolled, and an additional 15% could be considered “possibly” familycontrolled. His criteria for control, however—a 4%–5% stockholding
and representation on the board of directors over time—are at least as
open to question as Larner’s, a point that Zeitlin concedes.128 And even
120. Zeitlin, supra note 7, at 1081–82.
121. LARNER, supra note 21.
122. Larner set his criterion for management control as cases in which no individual ownership
interest held 10% or more of the firm’s stock, as opposed to the 20% that Berle and Means had used.
123. See Zeitlin, supra note 7, at 1083. Larner had published an earlier article previewing
some of the findings that subsequently appeared in his book.
124. Zeitlin, supra note 7, at 1083–89, 1118 (citing Robert Sheehan, There’s Plenty of Privacy
Left in Private Enterprise, FORTUNE, July 15, 1966, at 224).
125. Id. at 1083–89, 1115 (citing PHILIP H. BURCH, JR., THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
REASSESSED (1972)).
126. Zeitlin, supra note 7, at 1083–89.
127. Id.; see also Sheehan, supra note 124; Burch, supra note 125.
128. Zeitlin, supra note 7, at 1089.
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if we accept Burch’s suggested 5% proportion of ownership sufficient for
control, a level also used by the 1968 report of the House Banking and
Currency Committee chaired by Representative Wright Patman,129 it
remains undeniable that the dispersal of stock had advanced significantly
since Berle and Means’s study.130
What Zeitlin is especially concerned about, however, is the idea
that stock dispersal led to the decomposition of the capitalist class. His
attempt to show that property ownership and corporate control have
remained fused, or at least to raise questions about the claim that they
have become separated, is driven by his view that there remains a
propertied class in American society. This class, according to Zeitlin,
exercises control over not only the economy but also the larger political
life of the society through its ownership of corporations. This view, if
not fully apparent in his 1974 article, became more explicit in his 1976
response to a critique of his article by Michael Allen.131 One could
certainly raise the question of whether ownership and control have
become reconnected in the United States in recent decades, as some
argued occurred during the acquisition wave of the 1980s.132 Berle
himself, in an extraordinarily prescient discussion,133 raised the
possibility that the growing presence of institutional stockholders would
lead to a resurgence of owner control, or at least, to control by
institutions. His point anticipated a concern that is now widespread by
several decades.134 These “great banks and pension funds,” as Berle put
it,
[b]uy securities in corporations; thus far they have ordinarily leaned
over backward in not entering the management of the companies
whose securities they buy. But it does not follow at all that as their
assets continue to grow (they do) and their holdings of securities of
operating corporations continue to increase (as they inevitably
129. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90TH CONG., COMMERCIAL BANKS
THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES: EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (Comm. Print
1968).
130. A detailed study of this issue by Brian Cheffins and Steven Bank lends further support to
Berle and Means’s original conclusions. See Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means
Really a Myth? (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 121/2009, 2009).
131. See Michael Patrick Allen, Management Control in the Large Corporation: Comment on
Zeitlin, 81 AM. J. SOC. 885 (1976); Maurice Zeitlin, On Class Theory of the Large Corporation:
Response to Allen, 81 AM. J. SOC. 894 (1976).
132. See, e.g., Michael Useem, The Revolt of the Corporate Owners and the Demobilization of
Business Political Action, 6 CRITICAL SOC. 7 (1989) [hereinafter The Revolt]; MICHAEL USEEM,
INVESTOR CAPITALISM: HOW MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE
AMERICA (1996) [hereinafter INVESTOR CAPITALISM].
133. BERLE, CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 44–45.
134. See DAVID M. KOTZ, BANK CONTROL OF LARGE CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
8–13 (1978); Useem, The Revolt, supra note 132.
AND
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must) that they can indefinitely remain spectators of the
corporations whose stock and bonds furnish the vehicle for their
investments.135

Still, whatever the current role of institutional stockholders, we believe
that Zeitlin’s critique is misplaced. We maintain instead (1) that it is not
necessary to demonstrate a fusion of ownership and control to
demonstrate the existence of a cohesive corporate community; and (2)
that such a group did in fact exist in the postwar United States; but (3)
that the basis of this cohesive corporate community was in the
corporation, per se, not as Zeitlin argued, in an owning class. In this
sense, Bell and the other mid-century authors were incorrect to argue that
the business community had become completely fragmented. These
authors were largely correct, however, in their characterization of
postwar American capitalism as relatively benign. The pragmatic,
forward-looking segment of the corporate elite that we described earlier,
and that was cited by Bell, did in fact represent a qualitatively different
approach to business political action—one that, while relatively shortlived (from the end of the war into the early 1970s), was in fact
consistent with a broadening of democracy in the United States. In other
words, we argue that a relatively cohesive corporate elite did indeed exist
in the postwar United States and that this elite did in fact act with a
relatively high degree of concern for the larger community within which
business operated.
This group was based not on property ownership, however, but on
the structural interdependence that existed both among the largest firms
and between these firms and their external environment, as represented
by the state, organized labor, and the banks. We agree with Cheffins and
Bank136 that the separation of ownership from control during this period
was real. As thinkers from Galbraith137 to the Marxist economists Baran
and Sweezy138 argued, organizational position was now more important
than ownership of capital. Those at the helm of the largest corporations
were at the centers of power. And with this power came the resources to
allow them to be concerned with issues beyond those of their own firms.
The high performance of their firms, the security of their positions, and
the high levels of autonomy that these corporate officials experienced
also allowed them to operate with a long-term perspective. This “golden
age” of management, with its pragmatic accommodation to labor unions

135. BERLE, CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 44–45.
136. Cheffins & Bank, supra note 130.
137. GALBRAITH, NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, supra note 66.
138. BARAN & SWEEZY, supra note 42.
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and the state, prevailed from the end of World War II into the early
1970s.
Our aim is not to romanticize this period. This was the era of the
Vietnam War—a major foreign policy disaster brought on and
perpetuated by a series of mishaps by the elites who surrounded
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,139 as well as enormous social turmoil
domestically. Yet the American economy was relatively strong during
this period. The distribution of income became more equal, as the nation
witnessed the rise of a middle class.140 Although African-Americans
continued to lag far behind whites and continued to face high levels of
discrimination, there was progress as well. Civil rights became fully
encoded in law, if not in practice.141 Universal medical care for the
elderly and the poor was established, which provided increased economic
security for a large segment of the population.142 And changes in social
mores significantly expanded freedom of expression as repressive norms
were turned aside.
Alongside these changes was a corporate elite that exhibited
concern for societal well-being in a way that was, if not historically
unique in its existence, unique in its scope. Although corporate leaders
continued to oppose labor unions and government regulation, they were
also willing to support Keynesian economic policies and greater attention
to social problems, including education, poverty, and civil rights. A
good example of this approach is provided by Bell,143 who quoted a 1971
article in Fortune describing the views of Alden W. Clausen, the CEO of
the Bank of America, the nation’s largest bank at the time: “[Clausen’s]
thoughts turn often to: how to alleviate if not cure the blight now
spreading at Hunter’s Point and south of Market Street [in San
Francisco]; how to crack the city’s hard-core unemployment; how to
cope with student unrest at Berkeley or down the peninsula at
Stanford.”144
Berle, in his critique of Mills’s The Power Elite,145 raised a similar
point. “Some . . . corporate executives . . . do act as Mills records.
Others run museums of modern art, foreign aid programs, [and] civic

139. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (Random House 1992) (1969).
140. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998,
118 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2003).
141. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241(1964).
142. The Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
143. BELL, POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, supra note 76.
144. Id. at 292 (quoting John Davenport, Bank of America is Not for Burning, FORTUNE, Jan.
1971) (changes in original).
145. MILLS, POWER ELITE, supra note 51.
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services.”146 Some authors went even further. Carl Kaysen, for example,
argued that the modern firm, shorn of the need to maximize profit, had
become a “soulful corporation” whose managers were driven to do good
by their personal identification with the firm and its employees.147 It was
not necessary to go that far, of course. As the Fortune article that Bell
quoted suggests, there were entirely pragmatic reasons for corporate
executives to be concerned with the social problems of the time. Still,
these concerns were real, and they were reflected in the corporate
behavior of the period.
The rise of management that Berle and Means described, then, may
have led to a concentration of power among the heads of the largest
corporations. As the postwar interpreters of The Modern Corporation
suggested, however, it also created a corporate elite that, if not altruistic,
at least saw itself as having an obligation to society that went beyond
simple maximization of return to stockholders. In that sense, Berle and
Means’s worst fears seemed to have been averted.
IV. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE POSTWAR CONSENSUS
This situation did not last, however. As we moved into the 1970s,
the United States experienced a confluence of events that began to create
fissures in the postwar social contract. Most of these problems were
economic in nature, but they came from varied sources and were driven
in some cases by political events.
The American economy experienced significant growth in the
1960s, but government spending, driven by the simultaneous occurrence
of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs and the Vietnam War, led
to an upsurge of inflation by the end of the decade. This increase
accelerated during the 1970s. Meanwhile, American manufacturers for
the first time since the end of the war began to experience significant
competition from foreign producers.148 The balance of trade became
increasingly unfavorable, to the point that President Nixon eventually
abandoned the postwar Bretton Woods agreement, which had pegged
international exchange rates to the dollar.149 To compound matters, oil
producing nations sharply increased the price of oil in 1973, which
plunged the American economy into a severe recession. Unlike earlier
recessions, however, in which inflation declined as unemployment rose,
the nation experienced an unprecedented simultaneous increase in both
146. Berle, Are the Blind Leading the Blind?, supra note 55, at 22.
147. Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV.
311, 314 (1957).
148. DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES (1989).
149. FRED L. BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER (1977).
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unemployment and inflation. The inverse relationship between these two
indicators was a fundamental component of Keynesian economics. The
fact that policymakers could no longer assume that a recession would
reduce inflation created considerable consternation. In the midst of these
economic problems, the nation was also experiencing the Watergate
scandal, which, along with the residue from the social conflicts around
the Vietnam War, created a significant crisis of legitimacy among major
American institutions. Polling data from the period indicated that the
proportion of Americans who trusted major societal institutions,
including business and government, was at a historic low.150 Finally, the
establishment of two major regulatory agencies, the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, both signed into law by President Nixon, turned
corporations increasingly against what they viewed as government
intrusion.
In the midst of these crises, corporations saw themselves, and even
capitalism as a system, under siege. In response, they organized
politically and mounted a significant counteroffensive. This movement
has been well-documented by others from a broad range of perspectives,
and it is not our purpose to recount these events.151 Some aspects of
these events warrant mention, however. Among the most important of
these was the formation of a new group, the Business Roundtable,
consisting of the CEOs of the largest American corporations.152 This
movement also involved the establishment or expansion of funding for
conservative think tanks.153 What distinguished both the Business
Roundtable and these newly ascendant research organizations were two
things: First, unlike the Committee for Economic Development and the
Council on Foreign Relations, the Roundtable consisted exclusively of
businesspeople. Second, these foundations, including the American
Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, were distinguished by
their explicit focus on advocacy research. This stands in contrast to the
Brookings Institution, the Conference Board, and other foundations that
had received funding from corporations but had been devoted to the use
of value-free social science, in the hope that an unbiased understanding
150. Seymour Martin Lipset & William Schneider, The Decline of Confidence in American
Institutions, 98 POL. SCI. Q. 379, 380 (1983).
151. See, e.g., THOMAS FERGUSON & JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE
DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1986); VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES,
supra note 148.
152. JOHN B. JUDIS, THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
153. J. Craig Jenkins and Teri Schumate, Cowboy Capitalists and the Rise of the ‘New Right’:
An Analysis of Contributors to Conservative Policy Formation Organizations, 33 SOC. PROBS. 130
(1985).
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of social and political issues would serve corporate leaders in their
decision making. The goal of these new groups was to advocate probusiness political positions, without any pretense to objectivity.154
Thus, business groups during the 1970s took on an increasingly
conservative tone. They focused on two issues: the excessive regulation
imposed by government and restrictive rules imposed by labor unions.
Both of these constraints were seen as reducing productivity. In response
to the increasingly ineffective Keynesian approach to economic policy, a
rising group of critics, mostly from outside the academic world, began to
focus not on the lack of demand and ways to counteract it—the
traditional Keynesian concern—but rather on the lack of supply, which
was seen as a chief cause of inflation. Lack of supply was in turn viewed
as a function of the low productivity triggered by government and
labor.155
By the late 1970s, this corporate offensive had experienced
increasing success. In 1978, an intense lobbying effort by American
businesses was able to overcome an attempt to weaken the strongly antilabor Taft–Hartley Act, an outcome that shocked not only unions, which
had assumed a victory given the Democratic President and Congress, but
also members of Congress, the news media, and even the corporations
themselves.156 Similarly, corporations were able to defeat a proposed
Consumer Protection Agency in the same year. Even before Ronald
Reagan’s election in 1980, business had already experienced significant
victories. By the time Reagan assumed the Presidency, labor unions had
been significantly weakened, and regulations had been either removed,
scaled back, or with Reagan appointees now running the agencies, less
aggressively enforced.157
A. The Revolt of the Owners
Despite the changes that had occurred during the 1970s,
management’s position remained relatively secure. This started to
change during the 1980s, however. The stock market decline of 1974
left the market dormant for several years. Meanwhile, Keynesian
economics began to lose adherents, and alternative approaches began to
emerge. In addition to the “supply-side” approach, a second alternative,

154. JUDIS, supra note 152.
155. GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981); JUDE WANNISKI, THE WAY THE
WORLD WORKS (Regnery Publishing 1978).
156. VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES, supra note 148, at 148–59.
157. Id.
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known as agency theory, began to take hold.158 Agency theory had
originated in financial economics, and one of its central concerns, as
illustrated in a foundational article by Michael Jensen and William
Meckling, was the relation between shareholders and managers. By
managers, the authors meant the leading officers of the firm, as distinct
from the board of directors.159 As Berle and Means had suggested, and
as later observers had elaborated, managers and owners did not
necessarily share the same interests. Owners were concerned with the
firm’s financial performance, its stock price, and its payment of
dividends. Managers, while concerned with performance, had other
interests as well, including their own salaries and benefits and a desire to
limit dividends as a means of increasing their available cash. If Bell,
Dahrendorf, Galbraith, and Kaysen were correct, managers also had
concerns other than the pure maximization of profits.160 Among these
concerns was an awareness of the interests of the larger stakeholder
community, in addition to those of stockholders.
Managers are appointed by a board of directors, whose members
are elected by the stockholders. In the traditional theory of the firm, the
managers are expected to be working in the interest of the stockholders.
To the extent that stockholders and managers have conflicts of interest,
however, there is an inherent problem in the owner-management
relationship. Given the broad dispersal of stock during the twentieth
century, which gave managers a relatively high degree of autonomy, how
were owners going to ensure that their interests were supported? In the
view of agency theorists, the fundamental question raised by the
separation of ownership from control was how owners were going to
monitor their employees—the management. The primary answer,
agency theorists determined, was “alignment of incentives.”161 That is, it
was necessary to create a system whereby the interests of managers and
owners converged. A good way to do this was to ensure that managers’
compensation was linked to the firm’s stock price. And a way to ensure
this link was to use the firm’s stock as a form of managerial
158. Agency theory is not technically an alternative to Keynesianism. Keynesian economics is
primarily a macroeconomic approach concerned with the stable functioning of the market economy
as a whole, while agency theory is a more micro-level approach designed to understand the
governance of individual corporations. The leading adherents of agency theory, however, tended to
favor free market approaches to economic policy. In that sense, their views were closer to supplyside economists than to Keynesians.
159. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
160. BELL, POST INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, supra note 76; DAHRENDORF, supra note 6,
GALBRAITH, NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE, supra note 66; Kaysen, supra note 147.
161. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301 (1983).
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compensation. It turned out that even the use of stock as compensation
did not ultimately solve the problem. As the Enron case illustrated, it
was possible for managers to artificially drive up the firm’s stock price
and then sell out before others realized that the firm was worth far less.162
But our concern here is with another issue raised by agency theorists.
As stock prices continued to stagnate through the late 1970s and
into the early 1980s, investors began to see the possibility that many
leading firms were “undervalued”—that is, their market (stock) value
was less than their book (accounting) value. This was seen as an
opportunity. And as we moved into the 1980s, an acquisition wave of
unprecedented proportions developed. Although the United States had
experienced several earlier acquisition waves, most recently in the 1960s,
what occurred during the 1980s dwarfed these earlier events.163 Alfred
Chandler had shown that during the twentieth century, there had been a
remarkable degree of stability among the largest American
corporations.164 In the single decade of the 1980s, fully one-third of the
Fortune 500 manufacturers disappeared, in most cases the result of
acquisition by other firms rather than dissolution.165
This acquisition wave was fueled in part by the emergence of a new
form of financing—low quality, high yield bonds, subsequently labeled
“junk bonds”—and it was characterized by an enormous level of
instability in the financial world. Of particular interest is the rationale
that was used to justify this wave. In the view of agency theorists, stock
prices had been depressed due to poor management.166 The firm
takeovers were a means by which underperforming managers were
replaced by a new group who would operate the firm in a more efficient
manner. This created a situation not seen for many decades: a
management that was suddenly vulnerable. And in fact, there was
considerable evidence for this. CEO tenure declined sharply during the
1980s, and this trend continued into the 2000s.167 Firings occurred in
firms whose managers had been assumed to be invulnerable, such as the
1992 ouster of General Motors’s Robert Stempel. The increasingly
162. BETHANY MCCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (Penguin 2003).
163. Linda Brewster Stearns & Kenneth D. Allan, Economic Behavior in Institutional
Environments: The Corporate Merger Wave of the 1980s, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 699 (1996).
164. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND (Harvard University Press 1977).
165. GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RE-SHAPED AMERICA
(2009).
166. Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. F IN . E CON . 5 (1983).
167. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?
Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. W12465, 2006).
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precarious role of management was further illustrated in a detailed study
of ten firms by Useem.168 As Zajac and Westphal showed, an ideological
shift had occurred in which the earlier glorification of management had
been replaced by a focus on “shareholder value”—the notion that
managers were mere hired hands whose primary, if not sole, charge was
to increase the share price of their firms.169 These developments raised
the possibility that the era of the management-controlled corporation, the
firm of The Modern Corporation, had come to an end.
The idea that stockholders had finally reasserted their control over
the firm received further support from the continually increasing role of
institutional investors. As we noted earlier, Berle himself had anticipated
the growing role of institutional stockholders back in 1954, and he even
raised the possibility that they would someday come to dominate the
firm.170 By the 1960s, the trust departments of leading commercial banks
had come to hold relatively large shares in a significant proportion of
leading American corporations. The Patman Committee171 found that a
single bank trust department held a 5% or greater share of stock in more
than 29% of the 500 largest nonfinancial corporations. Based on these
and subsequent data, an economist, David Kotz,172 estimated that nearly
40% of the 200 largest U.S. nonfinancial corporations were at least
partially controlled by banks.173 And in a 1968 interview, Berle,
following up on his 1954 observation, noted that “about fifteen or twenty
of the big banks through their trust departments could today mobilize
voting control of a very large percentage of American industry.”174 In
subsequent years, commercial bank trust departments were joined by

168. MICHAEL USEEM, EXECUTIVE DEFENSE: SHAREHOLDER POWER AND CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION (Harvard University Press 1993).
169. Edward J. Zajac & James D. Westphal, The Social Construction of Market Value:
Institutionalization and Learning Perspectives on Stock Market Reactions, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 433,
451 (2004).
170. BERLE, CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 44, at 44–45.
171. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON BANKING, supra note 129.
172. KOTZ, supra note 134.
173. Banks in the United States are not legally permitted to directly own stock in nonfinancial
corporations. Many commercial banks had trust departments that managed pension funds for
nonfinancial corporations, however, and these trust departments were allowed to invest in corporate
stock. This gave the bank trust departments voting rights on the stock of the firms in which they had
invested. If their holdings were sufficiently large, it raised the possibility that the bank trust
department could exercise effective control of the firm. The fact that the trust departments of the six
major New York money-market banks all held stock in Leasco in 1968 (and the fact that they
simultaneously sold their Leasco stock) has been cited as a major reason that Saul Steinberg, the
President of Leasco, was forced to abort his attempt to acquire Chemical Bank. See GLASBERG,
supra note 115, for a detailed account of this episode.
174. Cheffins & Bank, supra note 130, at 35–36 (quoting Adolf Berle).

1102

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:4

mutual funds such as Fidelity and Vanguard and pension funds such as
CalPERS and CREF as leading stockholders.175
Historically, these trust funds and other investors were believed to
be bound by the “Wall Street Rule”: when dissatisfied with management,
sell.176 As institutional holdings became increasingly large, however, the
costs of the exit strategy became prohibitive, and there was reason for
these investors to exercise more of a voice strategy.177 As Useem
suggests, institutional investors have become increasingly active in
pursuing their agendas with the firms whose stock they hold.178 We do
not want to push this “decline of management” argument too far,
however, since evidence remains that managerial power has not
completely disappeared. Davis and Kim show, for example, that
although pension funds such as CalPERS and CREF have become
increasingly willing to challenge management, mutual funds such as
Fidelity have been far less likely to do so.179 Moreover, despite cases
such as the 1968 Leasco–Chemical Bank episode, a range of scholars
representing differing views have questioned the extent to which bank
trust departments intervene in the affairs of the firms in whose stock they
have invested.180 Cheffins and Bank provide several reasons that bank
trust departments would be unlikely (and unwise) to challenge
management, including the potential conflict of interest that might occur
were bank trust departments to use their stockholdings to further the
commercial interests of the bank, rather than the interests of the firms
whose pension funds they are entrusted to invest.181 Finally, events such
as the Enron and Worldcom scandals of the early 2000s suggested that
managers were able to engage in unscrupulous activities while shielded
not only from stockholders but also from their boards.182 Although these
may have been relatively unique cases in the same way that the Leasco–
Chemical Bank case was unique,183 the problems that they revealed were
deemed sufficiently serious to spawn broad legislation: the Sarbanes–
Oxley Bill.184 After an exhaustive review of studies based on evidence
dating from 1900 to the present, Cheffins and Bank conclude that “a
175. Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85 J.
FIN. ECON. 552 (2007).
176. EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER (1981).
177. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970).
178. USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM, supra note 132, at 54–61.
179. Davis & Kim, supra note 175, at 554.
180. See, e.g., HERMAN, supra note 176; MINTZ & SCHWARTZ, supra note 112.
181. See Cheffins, supra note 130, at 37–40.
182. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 162.
183. See MINTZ & SCHWARTZ, supra note 112.
184. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the
Implications of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1055 (2004).
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separation between ownership and control remains an appropriate
reference point for those seeking to come to terms with the historical
development of U.S. corporate governance[.]”185
Nevertheless, even if the separation of ownership from control
remains the predominant condition of the largest American corporations,
it does not mean that management has the level of autonomy that it
enjoyed during its golden age, from the 1920s through the early 1970s.
And the increasing pressures faced by corporate CEOs have
consequences for the fate of American democracy, just as the separation
of ownership and control did in the post-World War II period.
B. The Aftermath of the 1980s, and its Consequences for Management
We argued earlier that critics accused the much-maligned postwar
interpreters of The Modern Corporation—scholars such as Daniel Bell,
Ralf Dahrendorf, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Talcott Parsons—of
misrepresenting Berle and Means’s arguments to make their case for the
dissolution of corporate power and the increased democratization of
American society. We also suggested that these authors, with the
exception of Galbraith, may have ignored or underemphasized the degree
to which Berle and Means were wary of, rather than celebrating, the
separation of ownership from control. On the other hand, however
selective these authors’ readings of The Modern Corporation may have
been, we also suggested that their views of the postwar position of
American business contained an element of tenability. The leaders of the
American corporate elite during the postwar period did exhibit a
relatively high degree of concern for society’s well-being. Still, there is
no need to romanticize this group. The largest American firms continued
to aggressively oppose the actions of labor unions, and they continued
their suspicious attitudes toward the state.186 Yet when viewed in
historical perspective—especially when compared with the period that
began in the 1970s—the corporate elite of the postwar period was
relatively moderate, relatively pragmatic, and relatively conscious of and
concerned about the social problems in American society.
It was precisely the large, management-controlled corporations that
created the conditions within which firm leaders could exercise this
pragmatic approach. Largely insulated from market pressures, as well as
pressures from stockholders and bankers, managers were free to pursue
broader goals. It was not only management-controlled firms that
exhibited these tendencies, of course. Large, family-controlled firms,
185. Cheffins & Bank, supra note 130, at 52.
186. Vogel, Why American Businessmen Distrust, supra note 84.
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such as Ford, had shown great commitment to their local communities
for decades and continued to do so during the managerial era.187 In both
cases, it was the ability to act unrestrained by the capital markets that
was the key factor.
The economic crisis of the 1970s led to a breakdown in this postwar
accommodation and led corporate elites to turn increasingly against both
labor and the state. The acquisition wave of the 1980s then had the
effect of significantly weakening management. Increasingly less able to
act with autonomy and subject to increased pressures from the financial
community and their own peers, managers became less able to concern
themselves with long-term decision-making and the well-being of the
larger society. Pressures to compete in global markets and the firms’
increasing use of foreign labor (one need not worry about the nation’s
educational system when one can simply hire employees overseas)
further exacerbated this trend.
Mizruchi has argued that the consequence of the success of the
corporate political offensive of the 1970s was a paradoxical
fragmentation of business.188 Once business political action had
achieved its goals, continued organization was no longer necessary. In
response, corporations went their separate ways during the 1980s,
focusing primarily on firm-specific issues, as evidenced by the lobbying
effort surrounding the 1986 tax reform bill, in which individual firms, or
small coalitions, pursued narrowly tailored goals.189 The takeover wave
of the 1980s then largely ended whatever collective organization the
American corporate community had enjoyed. The shift to the system of
largely atomized firms described by Dahrendorf in the 1950s in fact
reached its fruition in the aftermath of the 1980s.190 The American
business community, now increasingly disorganized, became incapable
of generating any form of collective effort to address not only the larger
problems of the society, but also to even address issues of concern to the
corporations themselves.
C. Two Examples: Taxes and Healthcare
The corporate elite’s inability to generate effective collective action
can be seen in the response of the Business Roundtable—now the
187. Holger M. Mueller & Thomas Philippon, Family Firms, Paternalism, and Labor
Relations (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 186/2007, 2007).
188. Mark S. Mizruchi, The American Corporate Elite and the Historical Roots of the
Financial Crisis of 2008, 28 RES. IN THE SOC. OF ORGS. (forthcoming 2010).
189. CATHIE JO MARTIN, SHIFTING THE BURDEN: THE STRUGGLE OVER GROWTH AND
CORPORATE TAXATION (1991).
190. DAHRENDORF, supra note 6.
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leading political organization for the largest American corporations—to
two important issues: taxation and healthcare. Concerned about the
record deficits engendered by President Reagan’s income tax cuts, the
Business Roundtable recommended a tax increase in 1983.191 This was
an extremely unpopular position to take, but the Roundtable felt that it
was a necessary step in response to what they viewed as a dangerously
high deficit. Even if corporate leaders saw it as ultimately in their selfinterest, this position at least represented an act of responsibility, in
which business leaders’ concerns for the well-being of the economy led
them to oppose policies from which they had personally benefited, since
the tax cuts had brought disproportionate benefits to the wealthy.192 Yet
two decades later, in 2004, facing an almost identical situation in
response to President George W. Bush’s tax cuts, the Roundtable was
silent on the issue. In a speech at the Detroit Economic Club in April
2004, John J. Castellani, the President of the Roundtable, spent several
minutes railing against the deficit but made no mention of the Bush tax
cuts as a possible cause.193 This silence was especially striking given
that the United States was involved in the Iraq War and had recently
experienced the September 11th attacks—both events that could have
served as the basis for a request that the American public make a
sacrifice as a show of support for the war effort, which at the time
remained highly popular.
The difference between the Business Roundtable’s response to the
deficit in 2004 and its response in 1983 reflects what we see as the
breakdown of business collective action, the increasing inability of the
leaders of the corporate community to support a position consistent with
society’s—and ultimately its own—long-term interest. We are not
suggesting that a tax increase was the only possible response to the
deficit. We do believe, however, that the Roundtable’s willingness to
support a tax increase in 1983, and its failure to do so two decades later,

191. Business Roundtable Urges that U.S. Raise Taxes, Cut Spending, WALL ST. J., March 3,
1983, at 34.
192. Reagan’s tax cuts involved an equal percentage cut at all levels of income. Suppose, for
example, that person A has an income of $500,000 and pays $100,000 in taxes, while person B has
an income of $30,000 and pays $6,000 in taxes. With a 10% across-the-board tax cut, which was
enacted in the first year of the Reagan presidency, person A would receive a refund of $10,000,
while person B would receive a refund of only $600. And this underestimates the disproportionate
benefit of the reduction for person A, because person A would have been taxed at a higher rate than
person B, so his or her refund would have been proportionately larger than that provided in the
above example. See REPORT BY REPUBLICAN MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE (April 1996), http://www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tx-grwth/reagtxct/reagtxct.htm.
193. John J. Castellani, President, Bus. Roundtable, Address to the Detroit Econ. Club (April
26, 2004). The first author was in attendance at Castellani’s speech.
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reflects an inability to engage in coordinated collective action to address
what its members saw as a serious economic problem.
A second example of the weakness and fragmentation of the
American corporate elite involves its response to health care reform.
Mizruchi has estimated that the 500 largest American corporations alone
spent more than $375 billion on healthcare for their employees in
2009.194 Given this enormous expense, it would seem to be in these
companies’ interest for the responsibility for these payments to shift to
another entity, such as the state. Healthcare costs have been cited by
many American firms as putting them at a competitive disadvantage with
firms from other developed nations, all of which have national health
care programs.195 And yet American firms have been either unable or
unwilling to develop or support a proposal for single-payer insurance that
would demonstrably be in their own economic interests.196 The Business
Roundtable’s own plan is extremely general and contains little specific
content, certainly nothing that would shift funding from the firms
themselves to another entity, such as the state.197 Perhaps it is simply
ideology that is preventing corporate leaders from embracing a system
that would alleviate firms from one of their greatest financial burdens.
Perhaps the Roundtable has in fact conducted a thorough cost-benefit
analysis that demonstrates that a single-payer system would ultimately
cost corporations more than the current system of employer-paid
insurance. If this is the case, however, then it is unclear why the group
would not make this analysis available to the public. Whatever the
reason for its inaction, the document that the Roundtable produced, and
its piecemeal efforts to reduce the size of employer mandates in the bill
that was being debated in the Senate in January 2010, reflect a group that
is incapable of coordinated action to advance its interests.
What these examples represent, then, is a paradox. In the period of
managerial ascendance in which their power was largely unquestioned
and untouched, the leaders of the American business community
exhibited a pragmatic, moderate perspective that allowed them to support
a relatively active state and to accept the legitimacy, if not the demands,
194. Mizruchi, The American Corporate Elite, supra note 188.
195. See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, CONSUMER HEALTH AND RETIREMENT INITIATIVE,
http://www.businessroundtable.org/initiatives/health (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
196. One argument against such a plan might be that a single-payer national healthcare plan
would lead to increases in corporate tax rates that would outweigh any savings that the firms might
experience in regard to funding their own employees. On the other hand, firms in Canada, as well as
every OECD country in Europe, have lower tax rates than do American firms. Scott A. Hodge, U.S.
Corporate Taxes Now 50 Percent Higher than OECD Average, FISCAL FACTS, (Aug. 13. 2008),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/23470.html.
197. B USINESS R OUNDTABLE , supra note 195.
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of labor unions. In the post-managerial period, in which corporate CEOs
no longer enjoy their earlier level of autonomy, we have a fragmented,
ineffectual business community, one that is seemingly incapable of
addressing any of the important issues of the day. It is true that there are
individuals such as Bill Gates and Warren Buffett who have engaged in
significant philanthropic activities.
There are also groups of
corporations, such as those involved in a Pew Foundation initiative, that
have taken voluntary steps to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases.
These efforts are relatively isolated, however, and none involve the kind
of cooperation with the state that the Committee for Economic
Development viewed as necessary to address societal problems in a 1971
position statement.198 The corporate elite of the twenty-first century has
thus far exhibited little of the efficacy that characterized its predecessor
of the postwar period.
V. CONCLUSION
We began this essay by noting that classic works are often
selectively interpreted by their readers, or not read at all. Those who do
read the works see what they want to see and ignore the rest.199 We saw
that those who made use of Berle and Means’s classic work, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, especially those writing in the postWorld War II period, tended to focus on the separation of ownership
from control rather than on an equally important component of the
book—Berle and Means’s concern with concentrated economic power
and its implications for American democracy.
In reviewing these secondary works, however, we discovered two
things: First, not all of these authors were as unaware of Berle and
Means’s concern about concentrated power as their subsequent critics
had assumed. Second, however selectively they may have used Berle
and Means, with the hindsight of half a century, it is evident that these
scholars’ characterizations of the postwar American corporation did
indeed have merit. The separation of ownership from control helped
create a class of managers with a relatively moderate, pragmatic
approach to the concerns of the larger society. The resurgence of
investors in the 1980s, however, placed managers under increasing
pressures, which led in part to the fragmentation and ineffectuality of the
corporate elite.
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1969).
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Viewing Berle and Means’s arguments in a broad historical
perspective, we believe that they were correct about the rise of
management control. We also believe that they were justified in raising
concerns about concentrated economic power. Yet a system of
constraints existed in the post-World War II United States that gave rise
to a corporate elite that, if neither liberal nor altruistic, did exhibit a
pragmatic concern for the well-being of the larger society.
The turmoil of the 1970s and the acquisition wave of the 1980s
took their toll on this responsible corporate elite, however. Management
came increasingly under siege in the 1980s. This weakening of
management did not lead to a furthering of democracy, but instead
resulted in the thwarting of it, as the lack of business collective action
became just one component of the gridlock that gripped national policy
making from the 1990s onward. Managers’ fears of Wall Street
investors—both the professionals who handle investments for
institutional stockholders200 and the analysts who issue quarterly profit
projections201—have significantly transformed the system, but this has
not necessarily led to a more well-functioning political environment.
The sociologist E. Digby Baltzell, himself a member of the
Philadelphia upper class, argued that a democratic society requires a
committed and responsible elite.202 This is a statement with which Adolf
A. Berle, Jr., who wrote of elites “running museums of modern art,
foreign aid programs, and civic services,” might have agreed. We
believe that in an earlier era, the United States had a group that at least
approached this ideal. It lacks such a group in the early twenty-first
century.
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